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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
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 At issue in this appeal is the Government’s alleged 
breach of a plea agreement.  Appellant Eric Dahmen pleaded 
guilty to two federal crimes involving the sexual exploitation 
of minors.  That plea was memorialized in a written 
agreement that included certain stipulations that the District 
Court deemed binding pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  After the plea 
agreement was signed, the Probation Office recommended a 
five-level enhancement pursuant to § 4B1.5(b) of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.  Although Dahmen conceded 
the applicability of that enhancement in the District Court, he 
claims for the first time on appeal that the Government 
breached the plea agreement by requesting it.  As a remedy, 
Dahmen asks us to order the District Court to resentence him 
pursuant to a Sentencing Guidelines range of 108 to 135 
months’ imprisonment. 
I 
 In July 2007, the discovery of pornographic images, 
explicit internet chats, and suggestive text messages in the 
home of a fourteen-year-old girl in Cambria County, 
Pennsylvania, led state police officers to suspect that she was 
engaged in a sexual relationship with the twenty-one-year-old 
Dahmen.  A search of Dahmen’s computer and cellular phone 
yielded three videos and fifty-one photographs of the girl in 
various states of undress and masturbation, as well as another 
pornographic video involving a different minor.  On October 
12, 2007, Dahmen was arrested and charged with statutory 
sexual assault and child pornography offenses. 
Dahmen’s detention was short-lived.  He posted bail 
and soon thereafter began exchanging nude photographs and 
explicit videos with a fifteen-year-old girl from North 
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Carolina.  A few months after he initiated contact with that 
girl, Dahmen persuaded Matthew Ehredt to drive with him to 
North Carolina to visit her.  In spite of Ehredt’s warnings that 
Dahmen’s conduct violated his bail conditions, Dahmen took 
the girl from North Carolina to Pennsylvania.  During the trip, 
Dahmen had sexual contact with the girl while Ehredt 
operated the vehicle, and the illicit relationship continued in 
Pennsylvania.  When officers arrested Dahmen several days 
later, they recovered a cell phone video of Dahmen and the 
girl engaged in sexual intercourse. 
 Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Dahmen pleaded 
guilty to transportation of a minor with intent to engage in 
criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) 
(Count One) and possession of material depicting the sexual 
exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) (Count Two).  The agreement specified the 
base offense level for each count and referenced certain 
sentencing enhancements pursuant to Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or Guidelines), 
but made no mention of any enhancements pursuant to 
Chapter 4 of the Guidelines.  The agreement noted that 
Dahmen faced a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 
ten years’ imprisonment and a potential maximum sentence 
of life imprisonment. 
Dahmen’s plea agreement also contained a waiver of 
his appellate rights, subject to three limited exceptions: (1) if 
the Government appealed; (2) if the sentence exceeded the 
statutory maximum; or (3) if the sentence exceeded the 
applicable Guidelines range.  The agreement also noted that 
its “stipulations [were] not binding on the Court and [did] not 
preclude the parties from bringing to the attention of the 
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United States Probation Office or the Court any other 
information.” 
 Before accepting Dahmen’s plea, the District Court 
clarified that though “the plea agreement at Paragraphs C(3), 
(4), and (5) indicate[d] that the stipulations made between the 
parties [were] . . . not binding on the court,” that language 
was “incorrect.”  The Court explained that “if [it] accept[ed 
Dahmen’s] plea, the stipulations [would] be binding because 
the nature of the stipulations fall under the classifications set 
forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).”  
Though given the opportunity to do so, neither party objected 
to the Court’s analysis. 
 After the District Court accepted Dahmen’s written 
plea agreement and guilty plea, the Probation Office prepared 
a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR).  The Government 
objected to the PSR, claiming that Dahmen’s Guidelines 
range was subject to enhancement pursuant to USSG 
§ 4B1.5(b), which applies to defendants who “engaged in a 
pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”  The 
Probation Office agreed with the Government’s objection and 
issued an amended PSR that increased Dahmen’s offense 
level by five levels pursuant to § 4B1.5(b).  In response to 
this “dramatic change,” Dahmen’s counsel moved to 
postpone his sentencing, noting that “[b]ecause the plea 
negotiations, plea agreement, the guilty plea colloquy, and the 
[PSR] did not contemplate or anticipate the application of 
§ 4B1.5(b),” counsel required more time to “discuss 
§ 4B1.5(b) and its potential impact” with his client.  The issue 
resurfaced in Dahmen’s motion for a downward variance, in 
which he “object[ed] to the 5 level ‘bump’ which § 4B1.5(b) 
calls for, and . . . to the corresponding Total Offense Level of 
36 and the corresponding ‘210–262’ guideline range.” 
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 The sentencing hearing was held on February 7, 2011.  
After having ample time to study the matter, Dahmen’s 
experienced and able trial counsel did “not object[] to the 
soundness of the application of 4B1.5.”  After the Court 
applied the enhancement and concluded that Dahmen’s total 
offense level was 36, counsel were asked if they “agree[d] 
with the calculation of the guidelines as set forth by the 
Court,” and both answered in the affirmative.  Later in the 
proceedings, the Court gave counsel another opportunity to 
object, asking if there was “anything . . . in either the 
sentencing options or in the sentencing guideline calculations 
that [they] believe[d] need[ed] to be corrected.”  Again, 
Dahmen did not object to the District Court’s decision 
regarding the applicable Guidelines range.  Because neither 
party sought a departure under the Guidelines, the District 
Court proceeded to the third and final step of the sentencing 
process, during which Dahmen argued for a downward 
variance and the Government requested a bottom-of-the-
Guidelines sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment. 
 While arguing for a downward variance, Dahmen’s 
counsel returned to the issue of the § 4B1.5(b) enhancement.  
Counsel conceded that “[a]fter thoroughly researching [the 
enhancement, he] verified factually it did, in fact, fit” and 
consequently did “not object to its application.”  
Nevertheless, he advocated for a variance, arguing that the 
application of § 4B1.5(b) was redundant because the factors it 
addressed were “already contemplated by the sentencing 
guidelines under 2G1.3, 2G2.2, 4A1.1,” all of which had been 
included in the plea agreement.  The Court disagreed, rejected 
Dahmen’s request for a downward variance, calculated the 
applicable range as 210 to 252 months, and sentenced him to 




 Because Dahmen was charged with violations of 
federal criminal law, the District Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction over Dahmen’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Before we consider the merits of Dahmen’s argument 
that the District Court erred by increasing his total offense 
level pursuant to USSG § 4B1.5(b), we must determine the 
appropriate standard of review, which the parties dispute.  
Dahmen claims that we exercise plenary review, citing United 
States v. Rivera, in which we held that “‘whether the 
government violated the terms of a plea agreement is a 
question of law subject to plenary review.’”  357 F.3d 290, 
294 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Queensborough, 
227 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
The Government, on the other hand, argues that we 
review Dahmen’s claim for plain error because of his failure 
to object in the District Court.  In support of this argument, 
the Government cites Puckett v. United States for the 
proposition that when a defendant waits until his appeal to 
allege a violation of his plea agreement, our authority to 
remedy the alleged error is “strictly circumscribed.”  556 U.S. 
129, 134 (2009).  According to Puckett, we have “discretion 
to remedy [such] error” only where it: (1) constitutes a 
“‘[d]eviation from a legal rule’”; (2) is “clear or obvious, 
rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) “affect[s] the 
appellant’s substantial rights”; and (4) “‘seriously affect[s] 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”  Id. at 135 (quoting United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 732–34, 736 (1993)). 
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 We agree with the Government because our 
application of plenary review in Rivera is no longer good law 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Puckett.  In 
Puckett’s plea agreement, the government “agree[d] that [he] 
. . . demonstrated acceptance of responsibility and thereby 
qualifie[d] for a three-level reduction in his offense level.”  
Id. at 131.  But Puckett’s commission of another offense prior 
to sentencing led the government to oppose any reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility.  Consequently, the district court 
increased Puckett’s sentencing range.  Id. at 132–33.  Like 
Dahmen, Puckett received a sentence at the low end of the 
applicable range and never moved to withdraw his plea.  Id.  
The Supreme Court noted that “at no time during the 
exchange did Puckett’s counsel object that the Government 
was violating its obligations under the plea agreement” and 
concluded that, though “the Government’s breach of a plea 
agreement is a serious matter,” Puckett’s forfeiture of the 
claim warranted plain-error review.  Id. at 133, 143.  Because 
we are bound by Puckett, we review Dahmen’s first 
contention for plain error. 
III 
A 
 Dahmen claims that the District Court erred when it 
applied a five-level enhancement  pursuant to USSG 
§ 4B1.5(b) after finding that he “engaged in a pattern of 
activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”  Consistent 
with his trial counsel’s position before the District Court, 
Dahmen does not deny on appeal that he “engaged in a 
pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”  
Instead, he argues that once the District Court deemed itself 
bound by a written plea agreement that made no mention of 
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that particular enhancement, it was prohibited from applying 
it at sentencing.  Dahmen focuses on the following comment 
made by the District Court at the time he entered his plea: 
I wish to note for the record that the plea 
agreement at Paragraphs C(3), (4), and (5) 
indicate that the stipulations made between the 
parties are indicated to be not binding upon the 
Court.  However, this language in the plea letter 
is incorrect.  I want the defendant to know that 
if I accept your plea, the stipulations will be 
binding because the nature of the stipulations 
fall under the classifications set forth in Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). 
 The gravamen of Dahmen’s claim is that the District 
Court’s statement that the stipulations were binding pursuant 
to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) precluded the application of any other 
unmentioned enhancements, including those pursuant to 
Chapter 4 of the Guidelines.  We disagree.  Contrary to 
Dahmen’s argument, the District Court referred only to 
Paragraphs C(3), (4), and (5) of the agreement, which address 
only Chapters 2 and 3 of the Guidelines, relating to 
calculations of base offense level, conduct-related 
enhancements, and adjustments for multiple counts.  Neither 
the District Court nor the written plea agreement adverted to 
§ 4B1.5(b) or any other Chapter 4 enhancements, which relate 
to criminal history. 
 Dahmen urges that the Government and the District 
Court violated the stipulations of the plea agreement by 
seeking and imposing a five-level increase under USSG 
§ 4B1.5(b).  In his reply brief, he protests that his guilty plea 
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he relied 
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on the District Court’s statement during his plea colloquy that 
the Court was bound by the stipulations.  We disagree with 
Dahmen in this regard because his argument is based on the 
fallacy that the Government or the District Court breached 
one or more of those stipulations.  Dahmen has not cited, and 
we have not found, any provision of the written agreement, or 
any statement by the Government or the District Court, that 
Dahmen was immune from a Chapter 4 enhancement.  Absent 
such a promise, neither the Government nor the District Court 
could have violated the agreement by deeming § 4B1.5(b) 
applicable (or inapplicable).  Accordingly, we hold that the 
Government did not breach its agreement with Dahmen and 
that the District Court did not err when it fixed Dahmen’s 
final advisory Guidelines range at 210 to 252 months’ 
imprisonment. 
B 
 Dahmen next claims that his sentence of 216 months’ 
imprisonment is unreasonable.  In light of Dahmen’s 
appellate waiver, however, his argument in this respect must 
rely on his prior claim that he was sentenced above the 
applicable Guidelines range.  Having determined that the 
District Court did not err in determining that Dahmen’s 
Guidelines range was 210 to 252 months’ imprisonment, it is 
apparent that his 216-month sentence is within the Guidelines 
range. 
 We do not review the merits of an appeal where “we 
conclude (1) that the issues [the defendant] pursues on appeal 
fall within the scope of his appellate waiver and (2) that he 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver, 
unless (3) enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of 
justice.”  United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 
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2008).  Dahmen has not cited any evidence that his 
acceptance of the plea agreement was anything but knowing 
and voluntary; indeed, he repeatedly assured the District 
Court that it was knowing and voluntary during the change-
of-plea hearing.  His within-Guidelines sentence is plainly no 
miscarriage of justice. 
III 
 The District Court committed no error, much less plain 
error, by enhancing Dahmen’s Guidelines range pursuant to 
§ 4B1.5(b), and Dahmen’s appellate waiver prevents us from 
considering the challenge to the reasonableness of his 
sentence.  Consequently, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment of sentence. 
